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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 




ZINDA JACKSON, Exooutri."'{ of the 





PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE. CASE 
John and Lillian Jackson were married in Moab, 
Utah in the year 1896. There, were 7 children born as a 
result of this union. 
Prior to 1917 John Jackson became addicted to the 
use of intoxicating liquors and in 1917 Lillian Jackson 
filed divorce proceedings in Grand County, Utah, charg-
ing habitual drunkenness and cruelty, all as set forth in 
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the plaintiff's complaint. (Record, page 100 Ex. 11-12). 
Mrs. Jackson employed the firm of Patterson and Con-
stantine to conduct her divorce proceedings., and they pre-
pared and filed a complaint for Mrs. Jackson. (Record, 
p·age 12). 
Up to this time they had accumulated property of 
the approximate value of $50,000.00, consisting mostly of 
notes, mortgages, and other securities. 
At the time the suit was brought, Mrs. Jackson 
had advised counsel that she and her husband had agreed 
upon a prope-rty settlement. After the divorce action was 
filed John and Lillian Jackson came to the office of Knox 
Patterson for the purpose of dividing the property so 
accumulated. John Jackson brought the securities with 
him, threw them on the desk and said to Attorney ~at­
terson, "Here are all of our securities, split them fifty-
fifty." Patterson immediately began ·listing the prop-
erty for the fifty-fifty division. 
While the property settlement was being worked out, 
Lillian Jackson said to John, what about the support of 
the children, as you agre.ed ~ John said, I will not pay 
any support money, I will divide the property equally 
and you will have to support the children. A violent 
argument broke out. Patterson intercede.d in behalf of 
Mrs. Jackson, telling John that he could not expect his 
wife to rear, and support 7 children on a 50-50 split of 
the p·roperty. John became angry at Patterson, picked up 
his securities and left the office. The divorce was aban-
doned. 
John Jackson then moved his family to California. 
In 1918 apparently John J·ackson wanted his wife to se-
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eure a divorce. He e1nployed counsel hilnself, had the 
marriage settle1nent of 1918 prepared. This was brought 
to Lillian Jackson for signature. She and the- f·amily, 
including a son-in-la"~ and his "·ife, looked over the pro-
posed property settlement and again she refused to sign 
the contract and stated to John that it was the san1e as at 
Moa:b, she got nothing for caring for the children. After 
much argument and discussion John Jackson then agreed 
that he would will to each of the children· $3,500.00 if Lil-
lian Jackson would sign the agreement as prepared by 
John Jackson and his counsel. 
Upon the strength of that pro1nise and relying there-
on, ~Irs. Jackson signed the agreement as prep·ared. In 
good faith of John's promise to will the children $3,500.-
00 each, he delivered to Lillian Jackson a certificate of 
the Woodmen of the World for $1,000.00, which he rep-re-
sented was paid up, with the understanding that the 
$3,500.00 which should go to each of the four girls should 
have $250.00 each out of the $1,000.00 certificate, which 
then stood in the name of Lillian J'ackson as beneficiary. 
The certificate was so accepted by Lillian Jackson and 
she received delivery thereof and has ever since had the 
possession of said certificate. 
At this time ~Irs. Jackson asked John to draw the 
will but John told her he would not draw the will until 
the divorce was secured. Then Mrs. Jackson told John 
that she wanted Knox Patterson of Moab to draw the 
will. It was then agreed that he would return to Moab 
and after the divorce was granted and have Patterson 
draw the will, bequeathing to each of the- children 
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$3,500.00, less credit of $250.00 to each of the 4 girls on 
account of theW oodmen of the World certificate. 
Afte·r the divorce was secured, John Jackson wrote a 
letter to the W.O.W. asking for a change in the, benefi-
ciary of the W.O.W. certificate, making affidavit to the 
effect that said certificate, which has been delivered to 
Lillian Jackson, had been lost. A new ce·rtificate was then 
issued for $1,000.00 running to the 4 girls who should 
share in the original certificate, to be deducted from their 
$3,500.00 bequest. That was sometime in the early part 
of 1920. What became of this certificate to the four girls 
is not known so far as the Jackson family is concerned. 
However, it finally got to the new wife, whom he married 
immediately after the divorce. 
Thereafter, on September 7,1920, John Jackson came 
to Moab and to the office of Patterson and Constantine. 
He there related to Patterson that he and his wife, Lil-
lian, had agreed upon a divorce· settlement and that he 
agreed with Lillian that he would return to Moab and 
have Knox Patterson draw a will whe-reby he should will 
to each of the children the sum of $3,500.00. He showed 
to Patterson the marriage agreement and he was asked 
by Patterson why there was nothing about it, the will, 
in the marriage settlement. John replied that, first, he 
did not want to make a will until after the divorce was 
obtained, and, second, that his wife wanted Knox Patte-r-
son to draw the will. 
John J'ackson then stated that the· will bequeathing 
$3;500.00 to each of the children should be off-set as to the 
4 girls, to the extent of $2150.00, stating further that he 
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5 
had delivered to Lillian Jackson a ,~r .0. ,Y .. certificate for 
$1,000.00 and that $250.00 should apply to the bequests 
of each of the -± girls, reducing their bequests to $3,250.00. 
The will was dra\vn accordingly and as to the four girls 
the will reads as f oll o"~s : 
To Belle Dennis $3,250.00 ''she also to receive as 
beneficiary in n1y insurance policy with the W.O.W. 'to 
the extent of $250.00." The san1e wa.s 'vTitten in the be-
quests to each of the girls. 
All as sho"~ in Exhibit I, proffered in testin1ony 
but rejected b~~ the court. (Record, page 100). 
This will, Exhibit I, was immediately sent to Belle 
Dennis, to her address in California, and their mother 
was immediately advised of this fact by Belle Dennis. 
Therefore, ~Irs. Jackson, knowing that the will had been 
drawn was lulled into security as a result of the oral 
promise by reason of the execution of the will according 
to that oral promise. She never knew of the diversion 
of the W.O.W. certificate until after John's death. She 
never knew of the revocation of the will, Exhibit 3, by a 
new will of 1946, until after John's death. 
Upon the oral agreement she immediately took 
charge and custody of the children, reared and educated 
them to maturity. 
John Jackson, as a result of speculation on his 50 
percent of the property divided, ran his fortune up to 
around $100,000.00. (R. p. 220). 
We duly filed a claim against the Estate, a.s required 
by law, and the claim was rejected, and suit was brought 
thereon. 
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We were required to amen<l our pleadings. when the 
defendant set up the c·aiifornia Statute of Frauds. In 
doing so we qualified for the plea of estop·pel. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE EXCLUDED PARTS 
OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AND SHOULD GIVE FULL 
CONSIDERATION TO UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
(a) PLAINTIFF MAY TESTIFY IN RELATION TO 
ORAL AGREEMENT. 
(b) ATTORNEY MAY TESTIFY. 
(c) TRIAL COURT MAY NOT REJECT UNDISPUTED 
TESTIMONY. 
(d) SEPARATE WRITINGS RELATING TO SAME 
SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS. 
POINT III. 
COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PLAINTIFF'S 
PLEA OF ESTOPPEL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE EXCLUDED PARTS 
OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AND SHOULD GIVE FULL 
CONSIDERATION TO UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
KNOX PATTERSON AS A WITNESS·: 
Attorney at law, residing in Moab. Acquainted with 
John Jackson and his wife. Did legal se.rvices for them, 
from.1909 to 1925. Not on a retainer basis. Had worked 
for Mrs. Lillian Jackson in 1917.' 
Patterson then offered evidence showing the drawing 
of the divorce complaint of 1917 and also offered testi-
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I 
n1ony "~i th reference to a n1arriage settlen1en t gro·wing 
out of the divorce action; that the settle1nent was rejected 
by Mrs. J aekson because it gave her only one-half of the 
property but in1posed upon her the support of the seven 
ehildren. All of this testin1ony "~a.s rejected. (R., page 
181). 
In a day or t"To after the divorce action "ras signed, 
John Jackson and his "?ife caine to my office "·ith notes, 
papers, n1ortgages, and bills, and he threw them on Iny 
table and said, ''Patterson, here is all I have got, and I 
want to split fifty-fifty." I took the papers and started 
to separate then1, had a tablet, and "\vas classifying them 
into two groups. Then ~Irs. Jackson said, "You told me. 
you would take care of the children." John said : "No, 
I won't take care of the children.'' Then Patterson got 
into an argument 'vith him and told him he could not 
expect to divide his property fifty-fifty and have the 
wife take care of the children. John Jackson became 
angry with him, abused him, and walked out of the office. 
He heard nothing more about the divorce. Shortly after 
that he (John Jackson) left and took his wife and chil-
dren to California. (R., page 181). 
Afterwards, in 1920 John Jackson came back to my 
office and in the presence of myself and George J. Con-
stantine stated to me he wanted to draw a will. The last 
time that I had seen him, he was mad and angry with me 
because he said I had sided with his wife about taking 
care of the children. He said his wife had divorced him 
and they made a marriage settlement and showed it to 
me. I said to Jackson, "Why didn't you put this part 
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ab~ut the will in this agree·ment f' He said, "In the first 
place, I wasn't going to draw any will until she got the 
divorce; and, in the second place, she to~d me that she 
wanted Knox Patterson to draw the will." And he came 
to Utah for that purpose. In regard to t:4e marriage 
settlement which he showed me, he said that she told him 
that she would not sign it, and said, "No, this is just like 
the Moab Settlement, and I will not sign that unless you 
agree to take care of the children." And finally he told 
her he would will the children $3,500.00 each if she would 
sign this agreement, and he said that the $3,500.00 repre-
sented substantially what he had given his wife, so he 
wanted the will drawn whereby eRch child would receive 
$3,500.00. So we started to draw the will. He said, "This 
isn't right. I said that I would make a will if she would 
sign this agreement, but I have delivered to her a Wood-
men of the World certificate for $1,000.00 that is to apply 
on the $3,500.00 which I will to each of the girls." In 
othe-r words, $250.00 of that ce-rtificate would be awarded 
to each of the four girls, and so I drew the will accord-
ingly. I am speaking of the will of 1920. The will shows 
that each of the boys got $3,500.00 and each of the girls 
got $3,250.00. (R., page 184-186). 
I do not remember whether he paid me for drawing 
the will. He did not pay me for the divorce because he 
thought I hadn't given him a fair deal and that I had 
sided with his wife. 
The Court: "You we·re acting for him as his at-
torney~'·' 
Answer: "I was acting for his wife as her attorney, 
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because he told n1e that she had said that she \vanted 
Knox Patterson to dra"r the "?ill." (R. p. 186). 
George J. Consta.ntine and I 'vitnessed the· "?ill. He 
told me to mail a copy to Belle Dennis at Orlando, Cali- . 
fornia. George Constantine \vrote and signed the letter 
and rnailed it to Belle Dennis. (R., page 186-187). 
After this controversy arose, I asked }\ilrs. Dennis 
to send me the 'vill and she did. I received the $1,000.00 
W oodinen of the ,,~ orld certificate frorn ~Irs. Jackson 
from California. (R., page 187). 
JOE DE~TNIS' TESTI~ION"Y: 
"I reside in Fallon, Nevada. I am not an heir of 
John Jackson, but a relative. I am Belle Dennis' husband. 
She resides at Fallon with me. 
"I have kno"~ John Jackson since 1913, when I 
married Belle. I 'vas present at _Orlando, California, in 
the spring of 1918 and lived in the same house with Mrs. 
Jackson, when John Jackson came to the house with the 
marriage settlement. ~fr. and Mrs. Jackson, myself, and 
wife, and probably some of the children were present. 
I heard the discussion between John and Lillian Jackson 
about the marriage settlement. I did not take part in the 
discussion. (R., page 191). He handed her or gave her 
a marriage contract to sign and she read it over and 
said she would not sign it, that it was on a fifty-fifty basis 
and she would have to care for the children. They then 
started to argue and the argument started when they did 
settle down, he said, 'I'll tell you what I will do, I will 
make a will to give each of the children $3,500.00 a piece.' 
She said, 'If you will do that, I will sign it.' So, he went 
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on and said, 'I will give you that Woodn1en of theW orld, 
as down payment and he handed it to her. (Referring to 
the $1,000.00 Woodmen of the World certificate). As 
down payment on the bargain. 
''He was going to have the insurance policy made 
out when she got the divorce. He got the Woodmen of 
the World certificate out of his suit case.-
"I had a further conversation with John Jackson in 
1931, right here in Moab. Just he and I were present. 
He told me that he had a place out here that he would 
foreclose on, if Belle would take it over in place of the 
$3,500.00 and we went down and looked at it, it was the 
Stewart place. I think. 
"I had another conversation with John Jackson in 
1941. It was at the Moore place in Moab. That was in the 
fall of the year. ltiy wife and I don't know, but seems 
like Sinda was there too. When we went down and looked 
at it John said she could have the place in the place of the 
$3,500.00. He 1neant the $3,500.00 mentioned in the will." 
(R., page· 191 & 195 ). 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
"My wife is the daughter of Lillian Jackson. She 
is a sister of the brothers and sisters named as parties 
for which this action was brought. We are here together. 
I came to testify ·for her in the case. I would like. to see 
her win the law suit. I would not like to see: her lose 
everything." (R., page 193). 
Now let us note Record, page 194, page 31 of trans-
cript, when the above named witness, Joe Dennis, testi-
fied: 
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"• • • we also object on the further ground~ 
that it is hearsay, that this witness is an incompe-
tent "'Fitness under the provisions of 104-49-2 Utah 
Code Annotated, dated 1943, co1nmonly called the 
(Dead ~Ian Statute). Also on the grounds that it 
is proffered testiluony to prove an oral con tract. 
"THE c·Ol1RT: 'Well, the objection that it i~ 
hearsay and the objection that he is incompetent 
to testify, I "~in overrule. The objection that it is 
proffered testilnony to prove an oral contract i:-; 
sustained.' '~ 
The testimony given by this witness was not proffer-
ed testimony, but testimony on direct examination where 
the records show he "'as fre~ to testify. 
Then the witness continued to testify at length. We 
are unable to say upon what theory the objection to the 
testimony as proffered testimony is sustained. 
It is evident throughout, as shown by the transcript 
of testimony, that the Court excluded and meant to ex-
clude any testimony in proof of an oral contract, re:gard-
less of performance, part performance, or estoppel. 
(R., page 189, page 26 in transcript). "If you can 
show me anything that will take this case orut of the Stat-
ute of Frauds, gentlemen, I would be ha-ppy to do so, but 
there is no writing shown to take the case out of the 
Statute of Frauds." 
( R., page 190, Trans. 27). "It is evidence of an oral 
contract, but understand that is just a part of it, yes, but 
it isn't evidence of any writing or written agreement to. 
take the case out of the. Statute of F·rauds ... The Cali-
fornia statute says that you can't introduce oral evidence 
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to prove an agreement to make a will that is not in writ. 
ing, the statute says that you can't do that." 
(R., page 208, Trans. 43). "~ :a: "' and that it is not 
admissible unde·r the Statute of Frauds pleaded by the 
defendant, unless it is an attempt to show something in 
writing that tends to take it out of the Statute of Frauds." 
(R., page 209, Trans. 44). "THE COURT. I won't 
pennit you to pro:ve that by this witness. I think she is 
incomp·etent in the first place and I don't think it will take 
the case out of the s.tatute of Frauds in the· second place. 
MR. P ATTERS·ON: Because of an oral agreementT 
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson, I don't think that it tends 
to prove fraud. I don't think that what you are going to 
ask her tends to pro:ve part performance. You are try-
ing to prove by her testimony an oral contract." 
The Court, having taken this position that nothing 
short of a writing could prove the promise to make' a will, 
it is remarkable that he ordered a pre-trial or permitted 
the case to go to trial at all. It is incomprehensible~ when 
we allege nothing but an oral contract in our complaint 
and the part performance thereof by the delivery of the 
Woodmen of the World ce·rtificate and the execution and 
delivery of the. will, and the sup·port and maintenance of 
all the children to maturitv. 
eJ 
LILLIAN JAC·Ks.ON, as a witness in her own behalf: 
This witness was not permitted to testify except 
in a limited sense,, to-wit: 
I had a conversation with you (Knox Patterson) and 
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my husband, John Jackson, in your office prior to g·oing 
to California "Tith n1y husband and 7 children. One child 
was married, tha.t v.ras Joe Dennis' wife. I decided to get 
a divorce in California. I entered into a n1arriage settle-
Inent there with John. John and I had some controversy 
about the marriage settlen1ent. (R., page 201, T. 36). 
~Ir. Patterson then Inade the following offer of testi-
mony: 
~'MR. P 4-\.TTERS·OX: ''' e offer to prove by this 'vit-
ness, your honor, that after they had lived in California 
a short .tin1e, Mr. Jackson and Mrs. Jackson decided to get 
a divorce, and again the question of a property settle-
nlent came up, and he goes to his own lawyer and has a 
property settlement prepared, which was much along the 
lines as the one \vhich was prepared in ~Ioab, and he pre-
sented it to her for signature in her own home, in the 
presence of Belle and Joe, and she, after reading it over,. 
said, 'no I will not sign that, that is just like the Moab 
Agreement and I will not sign it.' Then they fussed and 
argued there for a day or two and then John finally came 
to her and said, 'listen, if you will sign this, I will make 
a will, willing the rest of my property to the children, 
which will amount to $3'500.00 for each of the children.' 
They thought that over for a while and finally agreed and 
under those conditions she signed this agreement, which 
is void, there n1ust be some consideration to support it." 
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson I understand that she 
got her share in consideration of it~ 
MR. PATTERSON: Certainly, they split 50-50, she 
is entitled to that without taking care of any children. 
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THE c·OURT: I will not let her te·stify to that be-
cause of an oral agreement. (R., page 208-209, T. 43-44). 
LILLIAN JAC·KS.ON, RE-DIRECT: 
Mrs. Jackson corrects herself on the date which she 
received the $1,000.00 Woodmen of the World certificate 
and says the certificate was delivered to her in 1918; says 
she has talked to no one since her testimony of yester-
day. (R., page 227). 
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY: 
Counsel identifies marriage certificate· between John 
Jackson deceased, and Miss Zinda Cordova, married Oct. 
3, 1921. John Jackson 46, Zinda Jackson 21. Also identi-
fies ages of 6 children of the marriage of John and Zinda. 
HENRY RUGGERI AS A WITNESS: 
Testifies that he has examined the authorities. of 
California with reference to the Statute of F'rauds, cites 
the following cases : 
Hagan v. McNary, 170 Cal. 141, 144, 148 
P. 937; L. R. A. 1915E, 562; Trout v. Ogilvie, 
41 Cal. App. 167, 182 Pac. 333; Demattos v. 
McGovern, 25 Cal. App. 2nd, 429; 77 Pac. 2nd, 
522; Zaring v. Brown, 41 Cal. Ap·p. 2nd 227; 
106 P-ac. 2nd, 224; S.mith v. Bliss, 44 Cal. App. 
2nd 171, 112 Pac. 2nd, 30; Long v. Rumsey, 
12 Cal. 334, 84 Pac. 146; Rotea v. Izuel, 14 
c·al. 2nd 605, 95 Pac. 2dn 927, 164 Pac. and 
914. (R. p. 220-224 & 228-230). 
The Court says: "* * * excluding proof of the alleged 
oral contracts to make a will I set forth the facts I could 
find IF I BELIEVED ALL OF· THE EVIDENCE AND 
PROFFERED EVIDENCE." (Emphasis ours). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
Then the court sets forth by alphabetical paragraphs 
the 1natters he could find if he believed the testhnony. 
K o"~ quoting fro1u Paragraph D of the possible findings: 
•"That plaintiff and John Jackson could not 
agree about a property settlernent; that shortly 
thereafter plaintiff and John Jackson moved to 
California and abandoned the· proce.edings in 
Utah.'' (R,., page 112). 
Now quoting fron1 Paragraph E of the courts pos-
sible findings : 
'"That about April 22, 1918 plaintiff and John 
Jackson entered into a \Vritten property agree-
ment in the State of California, wherein and 
whereby plaintiff agreed to accept property of 
the approximate value of $28,689.00 and assumed 
custody and support of 5 children, ages 19, 13, 10, 
6 and 3, respectively, and John retained property 
of the approximate value of $20,434.00 and agreed 
to assume the custody and support of the child age 
15." (R., page 113). 
Quoting from Paragraph F : 
"That plaintiff employe.d the attorney who 
drafted said agreement." (R., page 113). 
Quoting from Paragraph G of the court's possible 
findings: 
"That plaintiff and John Jackson had an 
argument about this contract in the presence of 
their oldest daughter, Belle and her son-in""law, 
Joe Dennis, and plaintiff said that she thought 
it was not fair, it was a 50-50 division and she 
would have to support the children." (R., page 
113). 
Quoting from Paragraph H: 
"That at the time of said argument, John 
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Jackson handed plaintiff a Modern Woodmen of 
the World Life Insurance Certificate for $1,000.00 
• • * in which plaintiff was beneficiary, and told 
her he would make out the policy when she got 
a divorce .. " (R., page 113-114). 
Quoting from Paragraph J: 
''That in Dece1nber, 1919, "plaintiff" hired an 
attorney and procured an interlocutory decree of 
divorce from John Jackson in the State of Cali-
fornia on the ground of drunkenness and cruelty, 
'J * * and made no mention of a property settle-
Ineut, alimony, or support money. That the judge 
who signed said decree was the attorney who drew 
the property agreement which was executed by 
the plaintiff and John Jackson." (R., page 114). 
Quoting from the court's possible findings, Para-
graph K: 
~'About March 13, 1920, John Jackson filed an 
affidavit with the ~Iodern Woodmen of the World, 
swearing that he had lost his insurance certifi-
cate, and on March 22, 1920 * * * Company issued 
a new certificate for $1,000.00 with the 4 daugh-
ters of John Jackson and plaintiff a.s beneficiaries, 
in the sum of $250.00." (R., page 114). 
Quoting in part now from Paragraph L of the pos-
sible findings: 
"That on Sept. 7, 1920 John Jackson went to 
the office of Patterson and Constantine in Moab 
and had the,m draft a will which he duly executed; 
that said will p·rovided $3,500.00 each for 3 of the 
children and $3,250.00 for each of the 4 daughters 
who are beneficiaries in his insurance poJicy and 
recited that they were provided for in his insur-
ance policy to the extent of $250.00 each." (R., 
page 114). 
Quoting from Paragraph N: 
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"That at the time said will was made, J ol1n 
Jackson told Patterson and Constantine about the 
marriage settle1nent agreement and showed it to 
then1. That Jackson told Patterson, 'I was not 
going to dra"~ any will until she got the divorce 
and she told 1ue she 'vanted Knox Patterson to 
dra ,,~ the will.; That John Jackson said the $3,-
500.00 each represented substantially what he had 
given his wife. That Jackson told PattHrson, that 
he had delivered to the Plaintiff a Woodmen of 
the World Certificate for $1000.00 and that it was 
understood that each of the four ( 4) daughters 
should receive $250.00 of tha.t certificate." ( R., 
page 115). 
Quoting Paragraph S : 
''In 1913, at ~Ioab, Utah, John Jackson offer-
ed Joe Dennis his son-in-law, to foreclose on the 
Stewart property and give it to his daughtHr Belle 
in place of the $3500.00. (Presumably the bequest 
in the will.) (R., page 116). 
Quoting Paragraph U : 
"In 1941, at 1\Ioab, Utah, John Jackson told 
Joe Dennis, that Belle could have· the ~foore place, 
instead of the $3500.00 that was in the will." (R., 
page 116). 
Quoting Paragraph W: 
"That from the date of plaintiff's written con-
tract with John Jackson on April 22, 1918, plain-
tiff supported the minor children of plainiff and 
John Jackson, who were left in her custody until 
they reached the age of majority or weTe self 
supporting, and educated them and supported 
herself until the, time of this action with the prop-
erty she received as a result of said marriage con-
tract and that plaintiff has exhausted the prope.rty 
so received." (R. page 116). 
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Quoting Paragraph X: 
"That John Jackson left an estate of the value 
of $97 ,931.35." (R., page 116). 
Then the court in its opinion, without any evidence 
thereof, says he "'.,.as obligated to speculate to some ex-
tent on the value of property distributed to each by the 
contract of 1918, and draws upon his pe·rsonal knowledge 
as to the value of cattle, mules, wagon, and harness in the 
Spring of 1918, fixing a value of $3300.00 for 22 cattle; 
$200.00 for 2 mules; $75.00 for wagon; $75.00 for double 
harness ; household furniture $1000.00; Elgin automobile 
$1500.00, making a total of $6150.00 and the court then 
says: (R., page 116-117) 
"On March 13th, 1920, John Jackson filed an 
affidavit with the· ~fodern Woodmen of theW orld, 
swearing that he had lost his insurance certificate 
and a new certificate· was issued to him on March 
22nd, 1920, with four ( 4) daughters as benefici-
aries." (R., page 117). 
Then the· Court says further: 
"From the evidence introduced and from the 
proffered evidence, I find as a matter of fact, 
that John Jackson did not deliver the Modern 
Woodmen of the World Certificate to Plaintiff 
in 1918 or in 1920 and that he made no repre-
sentations to the plaintiff concerning said certifi-
cate except that he told plaintiff he would have the 
certificate of insurance made over to his four (4) 
daughters. afte·r she procurred a divorce. I feel 
that the written affidavit made to the Insurance 
Company in 1920 is bette~r e·vidence· than the mem-
ory of the witnesses some thirty years later." (R., 
page 118). 
* * • 
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''That if any such oral agreetnent \Vas made. 
it is invalid under the Statute of Frauds of the 
State of California. That defendant is not estop-
ped to set up the Statute of F'ra.uds of the State 
of California." (R., page 118). 
HThat plaintiff is a proper party plaintiff in 
this action. I conclude that plaintiff's action 
should be dismissed a.t plain tiff's costs." -( R. page 
119. 
It "ill be observed in the caption of the ~{emo-
randum opinion that the court refuses to believe plain-
tiff's evidence in the case. 
Then in concluding the Memorandum Decision the 
court gives us the final knock-out blo\v in which he says : 
"I find fron1 all the evidence in the case which 
I consider admissible and competent that John 
Jackson did not n1ake an oral agreement to make 
a will as pleaded by the plaintiff or otherwise or 
at all." (R., page 118). 
This decision no doubt was intended to be decisive 
of the entire case, as the· general rule is that this char-
acter of case the superior court follows the findings of 
the trial court. However, we recall proudly that superior 
courts have uniformly held that a trial court cannot arbi-
trarily and capriciously utterly refuse to consider un-
disputed testimony in the case. This part of the court's 
decision is unwarranted, unfair, and unjust. This ques-
tion is treated hereinafter. 
The court talks disparagingly of the· memory of the 
plaintiff's witnesses, yet it does not hesitate to draw 
upon its own memory and go back 33 years to state the 
value of cattle, mules, wagons, harness, and an automo~ 
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bile, when the·re was no evidence with reference to these 
iten1s and n1ost surely the court had no knowledge of the 
kind of cattle or mules, and the wear and tear of the 
machinery. Just why the court saw fit to comment on 
these items we are unable to say, as all of the testimony 
shows a desire and intent to split the property on a 50-50 
basis, and, furthermore, the items which the court named 
were supposed to be included in the farm property for 
which Mrs. Jackson was charged $14,000.00. 
The court finds that in 1918 cattle we·re worth $150.-
00 a head, perhaps there are members of the court who 
can recall that we were in a financial slump and that 
shortly there~after banks were failing everywhere, espe-
cially those carrying cattle· paper. 
If our memory serves us, the Honorable Judge, 33 
years ago, was somewhat of a boy. 
The court further says : 
"I find one serious inconsistency with the 
testimony offe·red by the plaintiff, in that she 
testified 'three times' that she received the life in-
surance certificate in 1920." ( R., page 117). 
Now let us turn to the transcript and see what hap-
pened. We insist that plaintiff did her very best to tie 
the delivery of the Woodmen of the World certificate to 
the promise to make a will : 
"Q. Have you had possession of this certificate·' 
A. Ever since he: promised-" 
The obvious answer would have been, ever since he 
promised to make the will. But objections and the court 
ruling prevented the old lady from giving the correct 
date. Again: 
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"Q. Can you fix the time by another event? 
A. 1920, I am sure that I received it when I had 
that-" 
Obviously she was going to ans"rer when I had that 
agreement with John, but again she was frustrated by 
court and counsel. 
Then again: 
"Q. Do you kno'v when you got possession of that 
certificate~ 
A. I got possession-" 
* * * 
'~The Court: I won't permit her to testify 
to any event if she can fix the tin1e to an exact 
date." (R., page 211-212'). 
The reading of the transcript clearly shows that she 
would have fixed the receipt of the W.O.W. certificate 
at the time the oral agree-ment to make the will was had. 
It is evident that she was unable to fix the exact date 
except by the course of events at the time, and it was 
erroneous for the court to refuse to permit her to connect 
the date with these events. (R., page 211). 
I believe the record shows Mothe·r Jackson to be 76 
years of age. 
The court, in his memorandum opinion, says that he 
prefers to belie-ve the letter that John J acoibson. wrote 
to the Woodmen of the World where it is said he had lost 
the certificate than the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff. 
We insist that the affidavit of loss of certificate is self 
serving not germane to the- issue, but it is evidence that 
John Jackson did not dare to call upon his wife for the 
Woodmen of the World certificate because he told her 
it was a paid up certificate-. It, of course, she was not 
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capable of analyzing. Then, again in this connection, keep 
i,n rnind that when the certificate was changed and issued 
to the four girls as beneficiaries, neither Mrs. Jackson 
nor any of the: girls e~er knew of· such change until after 
John Jackson's death. So if he had promised to issue a 
new ce·rtificate with the girls as beneficiaries, they never 
received it and never knew anything about it. His call 
upon Lillian Jackson for surrender of the W oodrnen 
of the~ World certificate would have tipped her off im-
mediately that something was wrong and would lead to 
Inquiry. 
Jackson's affidavit with reference to the loss of the 
Woodmen of the World certificate was a deception which 
the court, in its prejudice against the plaintiff's testimony 
could not appreciate. 
(a) PLAINTIFF MAY TESTIFY IN RELATION TO 
ORAL AGREEMENT. 
We say yes, for the reason that the~ plaintiff, Lillian 
Jackson, is suing in a representative capacity and she is 
made a trustee of an expressed trust by our statute. Utah 
Code 1943, Section 104-49-2. 
It is evident she has no direct p·ecuniary interest in 
this proceeding. She sacrificed the W.O.W. certificate 
of which she was the beneficiary; the: will of 1920 gave 
her nothing. She sacrificed everything for herself to the 
end that her children should finally reap the benefit of 
any estate which might accrue to John Jackson by reason 
of the fact that he took the money from the children, 
approximately $24,500.00, to speculate on during his life-
time and built his estate up to app·roximately $100,000.00. 
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Section 104-3-1, U.C.A. 1943, provides every action 
must be prosecuted in the nrune of the real party in inte.r-
est, except that an executor, administrator, or trustee 
of an expressed trust may sue without joining the party 
in interest . 
..._\ person "itl1 'vhom or in whose nan1e a contract 
is made for the benefit of another is a trustee of an 
expressed trust within the meaning of this section. 
Section 104-49-2 disqualifies a party to any civil 
action and all persons directly interested in the event 
thereof. 
The term "party" as above defined has been the sub-
ject of a great confusion with the court, including o~r 
own courts. 
58 A. J., Sec. 282 defines the meaning of "party'~ 
as foilows: 
. "A statute disqualifying a "party" from testi-
fying as to transactions with a deceased person 
does not apply to one who is not a party o:r inter-
ested therein but is a mere witness.. According to 
some authorities, although on its face the statute · 
disqualifies every person who is made a party to 
the record, its application is limited to those per-
sons who are properly joined as parties, and fur-
ther to those of the prop~r pa,.rties to the record 
who are parties to the issue .. " 
Thus it appears that the term "party" is generally 
meant to include only those who are directly interested 
in the result of the suit. 
Sec. 284, q uorting : 
"Nominal Parties.-Although some statutes 
have been construed to include nominal parties 
as embraced within the me·aning of 'parties' dis-
qualified as witnesses in an action against a per-
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sonal representative of a decedent or the guardian 
of an incompetent, according to the construction 
generally placed upon these statutes, the 'party' 
'opposite party,' etc~, who is silenced, is the real 
party in interest, and not a mere nominal party 
who is not interested in the result of tke suit. A 
nominal party has been held competent to testify 
as to the execution of a lost deed by a decedent." 
(Italics ours.) 
· · Exsted v. Exsted, 117 A.L.R. 605 (Minn.): 
"The difficult question, and one of first im-
pression before this court, is w}J.ether an admini-
strator is a party within the meaning of the stat-
ute. Since it operates to exclude otherwise com-
petent evidence, the statute should be strictly, al-
though fairly, construed. Sievers v. Sievers, 189 
Minn. 576, 250 N.W. 574. On its face the statute 
disqualifies every person who is made a party to 
the record. The application of this language has 
been limited to those persons who ar:e properly 
joined as parties. (Towle v. Sherer, 70 Minn. 312, 
73 N.W. 180), and further limited to those of 
the proper parties to the record who are parties 
to the issue. 
"An executor or administrator, while a neces-
sary party to the record, is not a party to the is-
sue. In Bryant v. Livermore, 20 Minn. 313, Gil. 
271, opinion per Berry, Jr., the appellant chal-
lenged the right of Mr. Chief Justice Ripley to 
sit in the cause because of his relationship to the 
guardian ad litem and general guardian of the 
minor defendants under a statute disqualifying 
a judge of a court of record from hearing a case 
when he was a relative of a party to the action. 
The court resolved the question against the ap-
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pellant upon the ground that a guardian ad liten1 
is not a pa.rty, but is a representative· in the nature 
of an attorney appointed by the court of the~ real 
party in interest and by ",.hon1 an infant is re-
quired to appear in an action. He is not a party 
in interest merely because he is answerable to the 
infant "'"hon1 he represents for his negligent con-
duct of the suit or because in some rare circum-
stances he might be chargeable with costs." 
Thus it will be seen fro1n the reasoning of this case, 
'vhich follo"~s many Inore, that where a disqualified party 
resigns the disqualification is removed, but this 1\Iinne-
sota case and the authorities cited thereunder hold in fact 
that where a no1ninal party is suiting it would be a 
futile thing for a nominal party rightfully suing to be 
compelled to resign in order to obviate the alleged dis-
qualification. The law does not require a futile thing; 
in fact many of the authorities hold that a person is not 
required to resign as a party simply to qualify the testi-
mony. 
It is obviou.s here that Lillian Jackson' is suing as 
.the representative of her children and our statute makes 
her a tru-stee of an expressed trust. 
The case of Begovich v. Begovich, 60 A.L.R. Page 
1046, (Wyo.) goes to the right of Mrs. Lillian Jackson 
to testify. 
This Wyoming case holds that a guardian ad litem 
is not a "party" to an action within the rule excluding 
testimony as against a person since deceased, but merely 
a representative of the court. 
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In re Van Alstine's Estate, 26 U. 193, 72 Pac. 242. 
One of the parties was Dora S. Van Alstine, guardian 
ad litem, her testimony as a party defendant was ques-
tioned under the statute relating to "parties." To quote: 
"* * * By the express terms of said subdivi-
sion, the disqualification of persons as witnesses 
on the ground of interest is limited to such as have 
a direct interest in the event of the "civil action, 
suit, or proceeding." Unless, therefore, Mrs. Van 
Alstine has such an interest, she was not disquali-
fied as a witness. To be directly interested is the 
same thing as having a direct interest. A direct 
interest is the opposite of an indirect interest, 
and excludes the idea of contingency. A direct 
interest is defined in Winfield's Words and 
Phrases, p. 195, as follows : 'A direct interest is 
one which is certain and not contingent or doubt-
ful.' In Black's Law Dictionary it is defined as 
follows : 'A direct interest, such as would render 
the interested party incompetent to testify in re-
gard to the matter, is an inte·rest which is certain 
and not contingent or doubtful.' At common law 
a contingent liability for costs dependent upon the 
results of the suit disqualified a witness, but, by 
the express tern1s of the subdivision referred to, 
the common-law rule has been changed, and the 
disqualification restricted to a direct interest in 
the event of the suit or proceeding. The remote, 
doubtful, and contingent liability of Mrs. Van 
Alstine for costs is not a direct interest, and there-
fore the court did not e·rr in overruling the objec-
tion of the proponent." 
It is o1bvious that Mrs. Van Alstine was a rep·resenta-
tive of other defendants as guardian ad litem. We can 
make no distinction between representative of the court 
testifying and Lillian Jackson in this case, she is a trustee 
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of an expressed trust under the statute and having no 
interest is fully eompetent to testify. 
Re Grieve v. Ho"~ard (lTtah) 180 Pac. 429. l\Iark 
Howard, a defendant, "~as held to be qualified to testify 
because of the fact that he had no interest, a merely 
nominal defendant. 
In addition to the authorities cited, we have the 
Utah case of ~filler Y. Livingstone, 31 U. 415, 88 Pac. 
358, and Stats v. Stats, 63 U. 470, 226 Pac. 677, to the 
effect that where the controversy is between heirs of the 
decedent as to the division of the property of the estate, 
all parties to the action, and other in teres ted parties, 
may testify. 
In the case of Doty v. Doty, 2 L.R.A. (NS) 713, it 
quotes extensively from Kentucky case which analyzes 
the principles of law involved. We again call the court's 
attention to the fact that at the time these proceedings 
first arose there "~ere six minors, ranging in age fron1 2 
to 17 years. 
The court says in the Doty case, where they attempt-
ed to disqualify the guardian: 
" 'If she were to resign as guardian on learn-
ing that her testimony "ras necessary to, protect 
his interest, and another were appointed in her · 
stead, she could, after she was removed, and when 
another had been substituted in her place as 
guardian, testify for the infant in the action. * * * 
The action of the county court in appointing a 
guardian for him, or the failure of the guardian 
to preserve his interests by resigning, should not 
be allowed to destroy the infant's rights * * * If 
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the mouth of the infant's 1nost important witness 
can be closed by that person's being appointed 
his guardian, then the rights of infants may be 
often sacrificed by the statute that was designed 
for their protection." 
The guardian in the Doty case occupies exactly the 
same position as Lillian Jackson in the instant case, pur-
suant to agreement between the mother and father of the 
Jackson children. 
(b) ATTORNEY MAY TESTIFY. 
The defendant has questioned the right of attorney 
who drew the will for John Jackson to testify in relation 
to the drawing of the will made an exhibit to plaintiff's 
complaint. 
It will be observed that counsel for the defendant 
made no objections to the testimony of the attorney who 
drew the will of 1920 on the ground of professional ethics, 
but only upon the ground that the communication between 
the attorney and John Jackson was p-rivileged and bar-
red under our statute. This question has been decisively · 
answered by our own supreme court in re Young's Estate, 
94 Pac. 732, 33 Utah 382, which speaks as follows: 
"Prof. Wigmore, in his work on Evidence·, 
· Vol. 4, No. 2314 in concluding a discussion of the 
question of privilege, as ap·plicable to an attor-
ney and client in cases of will contests, states the 
rule as follows: 'But for wills a special consider-
ation comes into play. Here it can hardly be doubt-
ed that the execution and especially the ·contents 
are impliedly desired by the client to be. kept secret 
during his lifetime, and are accordingly a part of 
his confidential communications. It must be as-
sumed that during that period the attorney ought 
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not to be called upon to disclose even the fact of a 
will's execution, n1uch less its tenor. But, on the 
other hand, this confidence is intended to be te.rn-
porary only. That there rnay be such a qualifica-
tion to the privilege is plain. That it appropriate-
ly explains the client's relation with an attorney 
drafting a will seems aln1ost equally clear. It fol-
lows, therefore, that after the testator's death the 
attorney is at liberty to disclose all that affects the 
exec?.t.tion and tenor of the U'ill. The only question 
could be as to cornmunications tending to show the 
invalidity of the "\\ill, i. e., fron1 "\Yhich a circum-
stantial inference could be dra·wn that the testator 
was insane or 'vas undulv influenced. It mav be 
. ~ 
conceded that the testator would not wish the at-
torney to assist in any 'vay to overthrow the 
will.' " (Italics ours.) 
:1= * * 
"As to the tenor and execution of the will .. 
it seems hardly open to dispute that they are the 
very facts which the testator expected and intend-
ed to be disclosed after his death; and, with this 
general intention covering the whole transaction, 
it is impossible to select a circumstance here._ or 
there (such as the absence of one witness in an-
other room) and argue that the testator would 
have wanted it kept secret if he had knorwn that 
it would tend to defeat his intended _act. The con-
fidence is not apportionable by a reference to what 
the testator might have intended had he known 
or reflected on certain facts which now bear 
against the will." 
:f:: * * 
"In the following cases the doctrine of privi-
lege between an attorney and client is discussed, 
and it is held that communications or statements 
made by the deceased to the attorney preparing 
the will with respect to the subject-matter the~reof 
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and what the attorney heard or saw with respect 
hereto do not fall within the privilege." (Citing 
many authorities). 
Then again in the case of Anderson v. Thomas, 159 
P. 2d 142, Utah, 1945, this case cites the opinion in 
Young's Estate with ap·proval and then says: 
''That case involved a wills contest and we 
held that the privilege did not apply. The reasons 
for the holding are discussed at length and we be-
lieve the opinion to be sound. But it does not ap-
pear that even in a will contest case the attorney 
can testify regarding distinct professional trans-




58 A. J ., Sec. 505, Page 283, lays down the rule as 
follows: 
"It may be laid down as general rule that 
in the absence of anything in the statute governing 
the privilege, making it apply to testamentary 
matters, communications by a client to the attor-
ney who drafted his will, in. respect to that docu-
ment, and transactions occurring between them 
leading up to its execution, are not, after the 
client's death, within the protection of the· rule as 
to privileged communications, in a suit between 
the testator's devisees and heirs at law, or other 
parties who claim under him. A reason for this 
exception is that it cannot be said to be for the 
interest of a testator, in a controversy be:twe.en 
parties all of whom claim under him, to have those 
declaratioos and transactions excluded which are 
necessary to the proper fulfillment of his will." 
(Italics ours.) 
Re W-ebb v. Webb (Utah), 1949, 209 P. 2d 201: 
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"(6) As to appellant'~ contentions that the 
conversations bet\\Teen attorney and decedent weTe 
inadmissible because they were .confidential coln-
munieations bet,veen an attorney and client and 
would haYe been inad1nissible against the interests 
of the client and were therefore inadmissible 
against the interests of his legal representatives~ 
it need only be pointed out that even if there 
'vere an attorney and client relationship existing 
between attorney and the decedent, which the 
attorny denies, claiming only an agency relation-
ship, nevertheless, the conversation vrould have 
been adn1issible under one of the exceptions to 
that rule since both appellant and respondent 
were elain1ing under the client and the intention 
of the decedent "Tas ilnportant in determining 
what their rights 'vere. See Jones on Evidence 
2nd Ed., Sec. 2164 'vherein it is stated'* * * Thus 
where, after the death of the client, litigation 
arises bet,Yeen the parties all of whom claim 
under the client and the question to be deteT-
mined is not the existence of a right of action 
against the estate, but the intention of the de-
cedent as to the creation of various rights which 
remain ambiguous, the attorney may testify * * :K'. 
Thus an attorney has been permitted to testify 
in an inquiry to ascertain, as between devisees 
under the clients will and a grantee claiming 
under a deed from the client n1ade after the 'vill.' 
"From what we have· said it follows that the 
court did not err in admitting in· evidence the 
conversations obj·ected to a.nd that there was 
therefore sufficient evidence to sustain its find-
ings." 
Carey et u .. r. v. Owell et al. (Washington 1949), 20-i 
P.2d193: 
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"Attorney, who had drawn will and contract 
for deceased wherein she agreed to bequeath 
pr,operty to her daughter if daughter would look 
after her was not barred under dead man's stat-
ute from testifying because of his interest in 
suit for sp·ecific performance of the contract by 
daughter, where prior to commencement of suit, 
he had not contracted with daughter as to what 
his fe·e would be, he had no agreement for con-
tingent fee, and it was understood that a charge 
would be made for his services at conclusion of 
the case." 
POINT I. 
(c) TRIAL COURT MAY NOT REJECT UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE. 
Authorities are legion that trial courts cannot repu-
diate clear, concise, and undisputed testimony. 
20 Am. Jur.1030, S.ection 1180: 
"Generally, testimony given by a disinterested 
witness, who is in no way discredited by other 
evidence, to a fact within his orwn knowledge, 
which is not in itself improbable or in conflict 
with other evidence, is to be. believed; and in 
many cases it is said that the facts so given are 
to be taken as legally established. It is often 
said that uncontradicted evidence must be taken 
as true • • •." 
Hynes v. White (Calif.), 190 P. 838: 
"The only evidence bearing on the intention 
of Hay to make the first gift was that of Mrs. 
White (the beneficiary of the gift). A court may 
not arbitrarily disregard the unimpeached ei\Ti-
dence of a single witness. If her statement was 
true, all the elements of a gift inter vivos were 
present, and if the gift was made, even though 
the donor was immediately given absolute pos-
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session of the property, it did not 1uilitate against 
the gift." 
Parker v. Weber County Irrigation District, 68 
lTtah 472, 251. Pac..ll (1926), page 13: 
~'The witnesses were not impeached nor their 
testimony in any particular discredited or con-
tradicted or impaired. The court thus was not 
at liberty to disregard it and make a finding con-
trary thereto, which in effect was done by finding 
that there 'vas no such agreement or unde-rstand-
ing as testified to by the witnesses. In other 
,,·ords, the district by undisp·uted evidence proved. 
What this court on the first appeal said was a 
complete defense to plaintiff's cause, but the court 
by its finding disregarded such evidence and 
found contrary thereto; and hence it follows that 
the finding n1ust be set aside and the judgment 
based upon it vacated." 
Harness et al. v. Indu-strial Commi.ssion of Utah, 
115 l;. ______ , 17 Pac. 2d 277: (1949) 
"In the absence of some reasonable basis 
for disbelieving the uncontradicted evidence 
offered in support of an application for compensa-
tion, the commission may not disregard such e·vi-
dence. The evidence may, as a matter of law, 
require an affirmative as well as a negative find-
ing." (Page 279). 
The testimony of Joe Dennis is undisputed and 
without taint that the W.O.W. certificate was delivered 
by John Jackson to Lillian Jackson, and that he then 
and there agreed to make a will, willing to each of his 
children $3,500.00, taking credit for the $1,000.00 W.O.W. 
certificate, to be deducted from the bequests to the four 
girls. 
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Lillian Jackson's testin1ony is undisputed that John 
Jackson delivered to her the W.O.W. certificate under 
circumstances related by Joe Dennis. 
The proffered testhnony of the attorney who drew 
the will, which should have been admitted, is undisputed, 
and this will shoi\\rs the deductions provided for in the 
oral agreement, at the time Lillian Jackson signed the 
marriage settle1nent of 1918. Take the will of 1920 and 
account for those deductions in the bequests to the four 
girls, except as explained by Joe Dennis. 
The attorney could not get this information and 
1neet these requirements :in any haphazard way, it could 
only come to the attorney, 'vho drew the will, from ~John 
Jackson himself. 
The will is evidence of the oral agreement. The oral 
agreement, in turn, explains the provisions of the will. 
See authorities cited above. 
POINT I. 
(d) SEPARATE WRITINGS RELATING TO SAME 
SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER. 
Searles v. Gon.zales, 216 Pa.c. 1003 (Cal.) : 
"There may be instances in which it would be 
a violation of reason and common sense to ignore 
a reference which derives its significance from 
parol proof. On the other extremes are cases 
'vhich hold that parol evidence is admissible to 
show that separate writings pertain to the same 
transaction, for the purpo.se of establishing the 
connection by subject matter requisite to incor-
porate the separate writings under the the.ory of 
implied reference hereinbefore stated." 
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A.yoob v . .. J.yoob, 168 Pac.. 2d 462: 
"'Failure of writing to make express refer-
ence to precedent oral a.green1ent is immaterial. 
It is sufficient if they both together establish an 
agreement." 
57 An1. Jur., page 165, Sec.187: 
•'Proof of a contract to devise property in 
consideration of services rendered may be found 
in a "ill executed by the pron1isor and contain-
ing a bequest in favor of the person who has 
rendered services for the testator. In fact, it is 
said that under such circumstances the, instrument 
is strong corroborative proof of the contract." 
Citirtg Heatt v. Williams, 72 Mo. 217, 37 Am. Rep. 
438. 
57 .... -\m. Jur., page 171, Sec. 193: 
"The exercise of equity jurisdiction in the 
enforcement of a contract to make a will in con-
sideration of services does not proceed upon any 
distinction between real and p,ersonal prope.rty, 
the distinction is in the character of the services." 
Tigglebeck v. Russel, 213 Pac. 2d 156 (Ore.): 
"* • * The general rule is that, if the,re is 
evidence tending to show the existence of a con-
tract, proof of the execution of a will containing 
a devise or bequest in favor of one who performed 
services for the testator is corroborative proof 
of the contract." (Citing cases). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS. 
Following the points relied upon, and also follow-
ing the memorandum decision of the court, we discuss 
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the question as to whether the Statute of Frauds of the 
State of California is applicable here~n. 
The court applied the Statute of Frauds of the State 
of California in resolving the contract of 1918 entered 
in the State of California. The court wholly reje.cts the 
pleadings and position of the plaintiff that said contract 
of 1918 was subject to an oral agreement, made at the 
time the contract of 1918 was ente·red into. 
We reject the Judge's reasoning on this point, a~ 
will hereinafter appear. 
First let us conunent upon the situation: It is true · 
the plaintiff, Mrs. Jackson, had moved to California and 
it may be said she established a residence there. The 
contract of 1918 was entered into in the State of Cali-
fornia, but supplen1enting the contract of 1918 was an 
oral agreement which required the conclusion of thi:-: 
contract in the State of Utah. It will be borne in mind 
that Mrs. Jackson, the plaintiff, requests that John 
Jackson return to Utah and- have Attorney Patterson 
draw the will which he promised to execute and it will 
be observed that John Jackson did return to 1\Ioab, Utah 
and executed the will pursuant to his oral agreement; 
that JoJm Jackson remained in Utah the rest of his life 
and pyran1ideq his assets of $24,500.00 to something in 
excess of $97,000.00. So it n1ust be observed that Mrs. 
Jackson had a distinct idea as to where the concluding 
·· part of the agreement 'vould be consummated; she may 
have had particular trust in the Attorney she chose to 
draw the will; she may have chosen the laws of Utah to 
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interpret and enforce that will; and she must have known 
that the bequests of the will would be paid in the State 
of lTtah. 
One of the controlling rules in determining the lex 
loci or the lex fori turns upon the question of whether 
the statute of Frauds is substantive or p~rocedural. 
Another test rests with the intention of the parties . 
... \nother relates to the question of whether the con-
tract is against public policy. 
Another relates to the citus of the last act to be per-
fonned under the contract. 
While we intend to follow the citations of the court 
in determining the lex loci and lex fori and cite general 
authorities thereon, let us make this comment on general 
questions of law which affect the general jurisdiction on 
general questions of all states and all jurisdictions. Let 
us lay down the rule that in our opinion where any state 
has definitely settled such general questions it is no 
longer an issue so far as the text writers and annotators 
are concerned. So we definitely contend that both Cali-
fornia and Utah have decided one question in this re-
spect: That both the laws of California and Utah, so far 
as the statute of frauds is concerned, are procedural 
and remedial and not substantive and hence controlled 
by the lex fori. To state further, all questions arising 
in the instant case must be determined by the laws of 
Utah because California has definitely determined that 
their Statute of Frauds is procedural. That is to say, 
that if California and Utah have determined the ques-
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tion at issue, as to lex fori and lex loci, then we are not 
concerned with general rules laid down by text writers 
and annotators. 
Another familiar rule in determining the state where 
a contract is entered into is: 
"Where the last act is done which is neces~ 
sary to give the contract validity, is the place of 
execution of the contract." Page on Contracts, 
Vol. 6, page 6180. 
Then further: 
"Re1nedies are fixed by the laws of the forurn, 
and parties cannot, by the contract, compel the 
court to give remedies other than those which are 
afforded by the system of jurisprudence which 
the court adminis~ters." Page on Contracts, 'T ol. 
6, page 3617. 
So we conclude on this point that the blind adher-
ence of the court below to the "substantive" view wa~ 
error and, consequently the Utah Statute is controlling 
and the California Statute of Frauds has nothing to do 
with this controversy. 
The court cites Crofoot v. Thatcher et al., 19 Utah 
212, 57 Pa~. 171. In reading· this case the first thing we 
find is this : 
"Under the issue raised in this case, it i~ 
necessary to determine whether the laws of Utah 
or the laws of N ebra.ska govern and control in 
this case. It is conceded that the statute of liinit-
ations falls within the remedy, and the law of 
Utah controls in so far as the remedy is concerned 
as applied to a.n existing a.nd enforceable ca,use 
of action.." (Italics ours). 
The above case 'vas dealing with substantive law 
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of the State of Nebraska. 
The court also quoted l.J!l ercantile Contpany v. Fra;nk 
(Calif.), 56 A.L.R. 696, which holds that a chattel mort-
gage valid in California is valid everywhe·re. This is 
substantive law again. A man cannot lose his lien to 
property just because the property is transferred to 
another state. It would be the same if the chattel prop-
erty 'vere stolen and taken into another state . 
..... ;\.gain the court quotes McMan.u..s v. Fulton (~fon­
tana), G7 A.L.R. 690. ·Here again it is substantive law, 
interpreting the Blue Sky Law 'vhich declares certain 
contracts void. 
So it must be observed that whether the forum law 
controls, turns upon the point as to whether the· foreign 
law is substantive or remedial. 
The following California cases hold the Statute of 
Frauds of California is remedial: 
In re Balfou.r and Garrette, 111 Pac. 615. Held: 
~'Since the Statute of Frauds p·res.cribe merely 
a rule of evidence going to the enforceaqility of 
the contract, a subsequent memorandum could 
validate the transaction even if it were oral." 
Warden et al. v. Hutchinson, 231 Pac. 563. Held: 
"The court construing C.C. 1624, subdivision 
7, said contracts were not void and the action 
would lie." 
0' Brien v. 0' Brien, 241 Pac. 860. Held: 
"Contracts falling within the· op·eration of the 
Statute of Frauds, but made in contravention 
thereof, are not invalid in the sense that they are 
void, but are merely voidable." 
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0/frntan v. Robertson, 251 Pac. 830. Held: 
"Contracts within and in contravention of 
the Statute of Frauds are voidable, not void. 
The remedy and not the validity of the. contract 
being affected." 
Durbin et al. v. Hillman, 195 Pac. 274. Held: 
"Contract was. not void but merely unenforce-
able. We are not called upon to attempt to define 
the very difficult word "invalid" as used in Section 
1624 of the Civil Code, but it is sufficient for our 
purpose to say that it describes a condition that 
falls short of being void." 
More recent cases, as shown by citators: 
Leoni v. Delaney (Calif., 1948), 88 Pac. 2d 
765; Ayoob v. Ayoob ( c·alif., 1946), 168 Pac. 2d 
462-466; Brown v. Superior Court, 212 Pac. 2d 
878-81 (Calif.); Coleman v. Satterfield, (Calif., 
1950), 223 Pac. 2d 61-63; Monorco v. Le Grecco~ 
211 Pac. 2d 363 (Calif.). 
Let it also be understood that the subject of public 
policy is a criterion for determination of the lex fori 
as against the lex loci : 
It is our contention, as we allege, that the alleged 
written rna.rria.ge settlement between plaintiff and John 
Jackson, standing alone, is wholly against the public 
policy of both th~ states of California and Utah. 
Here we have a contract which admittedly purports 
to divide equally the community property acquired by 
the plaintiff and her husband during marriage. Then 
we have a husband shunting his wife and seven children 
from their horne in Utah to California, where a marriage 
settlen1ent is executed, which, construed alone, gives the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
wife only one-half the property, to \vhich she is entitled 
if there 'vere no children, and then imposing upon her 
the obligation to support and educate the children until 
they reach their majority 'vithout support mone:y or other 
consideration. We say: That such a contract is against 
public policy; that without the oral agreement, pleaded 
by the plaintiff, it cannot be given validity. It requires 
the oral agreement to make the settlement fair, just and 
equitable, and "Te believe it to be the policy of the court 
to adopt a course which will give legality to such con-
tracts. 
The case of Palmer v. Palmer, 26 U. 31, 75 Pac. 3, 
is a case cited by the court, the first syllabus of which 
reads: 
HThe principle of comity cannot be invoked 
to require one state to enforce a contract entered 
into in another state, where the contract is in 
contravention of the publiC- policy of the state 
in which enforcement is sought." 
A reading of the case will verify the syllabus. 
In the case of Mertz v. Mertz, 108 A.L.R. 1120, the 
courts of New York refused to enforce a contract entered 
into in Connecticut between husband and wife because 
it was in contravention of public policy of New York. 
Let us invoke another general rule. That where a 
husband and wife are dealing with each other in family 
matters, the husband is bound to the utmost go<>d faith. 
In this case the wife was not represented by counsel. 
She had no advice in the marriage settlement, .and the 
attorney who drew the marriage· settlement, later became 
the judge in the divorce action was granted 
the judge in the divorce action who granted the decree. 
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No mention of the marriage settlement in the decree of 
divorce. N e·ver confirrned by any court. 
Quoting from 26 Am. Jur., 876: 
"The relationship of husbarid wife is gen-
erally regarded as a confidential nature. In :many 
jurisdictions, particularly the cornmunity proper-
ty jurisdictions, statutes expressly provide that 
transactions between them shall be subject to the 
general law governing transactions between per-
sons in a confidential relationship * * * the doc-
trine that fraud may be predicated on unfulfilled 
promises made with an intention of nonperform-
ance has been applied to promises of one spouse 
inducing a conveyance to hin1 or her fro1n the 
other spouse * * *. It is recognized that the n1ost 
dominant influence of all relations is that of hus-
band over wife, and transactions between them, 
to be valid,; particularly as to her, must be fair 
and reasonable and voluntarily and understand-
ingly made. Such transactions are jealously scru-
tinized to prevent the wife from being overreached 
or defrauded by the undue influence or improper 
con/duct of the husband; and when they are 
brought about by anythrng runounting to con-
structive fraud on his p·art they are voidable by 
the wife and are. not enforceable against her, at 
least in equity. At least such. transactions are 
voidable against all p·ersons other than bona fide 
purchasers. Whenever independent counsel would 
be of real assistance to the, wife in deciding whe-
ther to enter into a transaction with her husband, 
it is his duty to advise her to seek such counsel; 
Jorgenson et al. v. Pardee (C'alifornia, 19,50), 224 
Pac. 2d 835: 
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••• • • Confidential relations are presumed 
to exist between husband and wife, and in his 
dealings with his wife the husband, if he obtains 
an advantage over her, 1nust show that he has 
not abused the eonfidence presumably reposed in 
him by her and resulting from the marital rela-
tionship. If the husband fails to bear the. burden 
of showing that the transaetion with his wife was 
fair and just and fully understood by her, the pre-
sumption arises that the transaction was entered 
into by the wife under the undue inuflence of her 
husband and was fraudulent." 
Fernandez v. Aburrea, 183 Pac. 366, holds that a 
father has a continuing duty to support his children. 
State v. Supreme Court, 74 Pac. 2d 888 (Washing-
ton), Syllabus: 
•'Father was under a common law obigation 
to support his child during its minority and such 
obligation continued without regard to divorce 
decree, since parties could not, by divorce decree, 
stipulate away right of child to support by fa-
ther." 
Tremayne v. Tremayne, 115 Utah ______ , 211 Pac. 2d 
452: (1949) 
Then further: 
Anthony v. Anthony, 211 Pac. 2d 331 (Calif.) : 
"Property settlement contracts are binding 
only when approved by the court." 
Danz v. Danz, 216 Pac. 2d 162 (Calif.) : 
"The duty to provide for children is a matter 
of public policy." 
POINT III. 
COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PLAINTIFF'S 
PLEA OF ESTOPPEL. 
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So we will now discuss the question of estoppel 
under general law and under California law. 
Of course, if the court should agree with us that 
the California law is remedial and not substantive, this 
argument is surplusage because we would be under Utah 
law solely. 
As heretofore stated, we clearly recognize the prin-
ciple in this class of case that we must present clear and 
concise evidence, taking into account every circumstance 
relating to the transaction, and that we must show a 
change of position with reference to those claiming under 
the oral contract and an enrichment to those who "\vould 
re~pudiate the oral contract. We, therefore, start with 
the position of the parties, reiterating: 
That by reason of the oral agreement pleaded, the 
position of the 'vife was changed in this : She assumed 
an obligation which "\Vas to run for approximately twenty 
years, an obligation which her husband was compelled 
as a matter of law to assume, or, at least, a substantial 
portion of it. She sacrificed her right as beneficiary 
under W.O.W. insurance, she was tied up for the next 
twenty years to warrant the care, control, and education 
of said children; she sacrificed the right to present this 
question_ squarely before the court in obtaining fair 
and just support money against he~r husband, a present~ 
existing obligation resting upon him. That he was per-
mitted to take the childrens' share of the property, spec-
ulate with it at will 'vhile she was exhausting her re-
sources to carry the burden, which he was duty bound 
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to share; that all of this 'vas suffered "~hiJe relying upon 
his promise to "ill to the children $3,500.00, 'vhich he 
did, but after she ha.d fully perforn1ed on her side, he 
attempted to revoke the contract will, thus defeating 
his oral pron1ise, upon " .. hich she relied. That he fully 
complied in 1naking the contract " .. ill, of 'vhich she was 
fully advised and thus lead to believe that John was act-
ing in good faith. 
There were no laches on her part. She did not know 
the contract will was ever revoked, and she did not know 
a new will was made until his death. She thus had no 
opportunity of protecting herself until these acts of 
repudiation had become manifest. 
That he "~as extremely anxious for her to obtain the 
divorce must be evidenced from the fact that within 
less than one year after her decree became final, he 
came back to :Moab, and married another wife·, Zinda 
Cordova, of the age of twenty-one years, and had six 
children as a result of that marriage. 
That the deceased was greatly enriched by the use 
of the $24,500.00, the use of which was reserved to him 
during his lifetime, thus relieving him of the burden of 
providing for his minor children. He increased the sum 
from $24,500.00 to approximately $100,000.00. 
That the enforcement of this oral contract would 
not be onerous to the second wife or her children since 
they would have left to them around $75,000.00. F'ur-
thermore, Zinda Jackson is not an innocent p·arty. She 
kne:w that John Jackson was the father of these seven 
children and that he· had a legal duty to support them. 
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49 A.J ., Sec. 306, page 617 : 
"* * * and in son1e cases which have con-
sidered the fact that the oral agree1nent has been 
acted upon the rule has nevertheless be.en applied. 
Other cases, however, and this seems to be the 
majority rule, liinit the doctrine to executory 
Inodifications. Accordingly, in many cases where 
the agreement as modified has been acted upon, 
the rights of the parties have been held to be 
determined by the n1odified agreement. This is 
especially true if there has been what amounts 
to a part performance, or if both parties have 
governed themselves by the modified agreement. 
These courts, while recognizmg the. general prin-
ciple that an agreement required by the statute 
of frauds to be in writing may not be substantially 
altered by an oral agreement, take the position 
that parties may not accept the· benefits from 
such alteration and then claim that the transac-
tion is void." 
49 A.J., Sec. 550, page 853: 
"* * * The courts have repeatedly reiterat.ed 
that the statute of frauds only applies to execu-
tory, as distinguished from executed, contracts; 
if a;n oral contract, otherwise within the stat1.1rte, 
·is completely executed or performed it is taken 
out of the operation of the statute. This is upon 
the basis of the often-repeated theory that the 
statute of frauds was intend.ed to p·reve.n,t fraud 
and not to be a cloak for fraud or a mearns of 
perpetrating fraud, under this rule of completed 
performOJnce, suit may be brought upon the con-
tract in a court of law over the objection that the 
contract was 1.vithin the statute of fra.u.ds." (Italics 
ours). 
49 A.J ., Sec. 582, page 889 : 
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"RELATION BETWEEN DOCTRINE OF 
ESTOPPEL AND P~ART PERFORMANCE.-
The doctrine that part performance will take· an 
oral contract out of the statute of frauds rests 
in its essence upon the ground of estoppel, and 
it has been said that 1nany of the objections to 
the doctrine of part performance fall away when 
it is viewed as an application of principles of 
estoppel. The doctrine of part performance op·er-
ates on the theory of estoppel, particul~arly estop-
pel by conduct, to a certain extent, and not upon 
any notion that the court has power to dispense 
with the statute, or that it is not as obligatory in 
equity as at lau,_ However, this doctrine had its 
origin prior to and independently of the modern 
doctrine of estoppel by conduct, and its op·e.ra-
tion is more extensive than that of the ordinary 
forms of estoppel; under the doctrine o[ part per-
formance, a person may not only be· precluded 
from asserting his title or interest in property, 
but he may even be compelled to make good or to 
specifically perform his representations. On the 
other hand, although the acts of one of the parties 
to an oral contract may be insufficient to amount 
to part performance, the other party to the con-
tract may be estopped by his conduct to assert 
the statute of frauds against the contract." (Italics 
ours). 
19 A.J ., Sec. 52, page 656 : 
Then we find the modification, which in effect holds 
that the former doctrine is lacking in consideration, Sec. 
53, to quote : 
"The broad rule stated in the preceding sec-
tion to the effect that a promise to do or not to 
do something in the future does not work an estop~.. 
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pel must be qualified, since there are numerous 
cases in which an estoppel has been predicated on 
promises or assurances as to future conil;uct. The 
doctrine of "promissory estoppel" is by no means 
new, although the name has been adopted only in 
comparatively recent years. According to that 
doctrine, an estoppel may arise from the making 
of a promise, even though without consideration, 
if it was intended that the promise should be 
relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and a 
refusal to enforce it would result in othe;r injus-
tice. Promissory estoppel is sometimes spoken of 
as a species of consideration or as. a substitute 
for, or the equivalent of, consideration, but the 
basis of the doctrine is not so much one of con-
tract with a substitute for consideration, as an 
application of the general principle of estoppel, 
since the estoppel may arise although the change 
of position of the. promisee was not in any way an 
inducement to the promise and was not regarded 
by the parties as any consideration therefor." 
(Italics ours). 
49 A.J ., Sec. 556, page 862 : 
"Under the rule stated, where. one of the 
parties to an unenforceable oral .contract has 
rendered services thereunder for the other, made 
improvements on the land of such other party, 
paid out money to such other party, or has parted 
with and turned over to the other party pToperty 
real or personal as the consideration for a promise 
which the latter refuses to perform, asserting the 
protection of the statute of frauds, the law will 
raise an implied promise on the part of the latter 
to p·ay for what bas been done in the way of per-
formance, holding him liable for the value of the 
benefits which he has re-ceived. A party who has 
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repudiated his verbal contract cannot invoke the 
statute of frauds to enable hhn to retain 'v hat he 
has received of the other party under it in part 
perfor1nance thereof.~-
There is no attack upon our pleading, no de1nnrrer, 
no motion "~as filed in the cause and we distinctly raise 
the issue of estoppel, as """ell as fraud. 
In the case of ]If onsen et al. v. Monsen, 162 Pac. 90 
(Calif.), ,,~e find the following: 
''A man may n1~ke a valid contract, binding 
himself to dispose of his property in a particular 
way by will, and a court of equity will enforce 
such agreement specifically by treating the heirs 
as trustees and compelling them to convey the 
property. (Cases cited). 
''The requirement of Civ. Code, Sec. 3390, 
that to be specifically enforced the terms of an 
agreement must be sufficiently ~ertain to make 
the precise act which is to be done clearly ascer-
tainable, applied to contracts to dispose of pro~ 
perty by will." (Cases cited). 
Notten et al. v. Mensing et al. (C;alif.), 45 Pac. 2d 
198: 
"Estop·pel-it is not necessary to existence 
of an equitable estoppel that there should exist a 
design to deceive or defraud, but it is sufficient if 
person against whom estop·pel is asserted by his 
silence or his rep-resentation has asserted a belief 
of existence of a state of facts which it 'vould be 
unconscionable to deny. 
"Frauds, statute of-Complaint alleging o~ral 
agreement of husband and wife to leave property 
to their respective collateral kindred, making of 
reciprocal wills pursuant to agreement, husband's 
death before either will was revoked, 'vife's 
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acceptance of benefits under husband's will, wife's 
revocation of old will and execution of new one 
in violation of oral agreement, held sufficient to 
raise estoppel to plead statute of frauds. ( Civ. 
Code, Sec. 1624, subd. 6; Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 
1973, subd. 6)." 
This case involves construction of n1utual wills. 
In the instant case we have the pro1nise to make a 
will on the one side, the consideration of which is the 
services of the wife on the other side in rearing, support-
ing, and educating the children of husband and wife. 
It cannot be denied that the plaintiff has fully per-
formed; it cannot be denied that the deceased, John 
Jackson, performed to the extent of making a will, pur-
suant to the mutual understanding between the two. 
N o"r what difference can there be in principle in 
the issues involved in the case at bar and the n1aking 
of 1nutual wills described in the case of N ott en v. Mensing 
et al.? Likewise, is there any distinction in the principle 
involved in the case at bar and Monsen v. Monsen, above 
quoted 1 
In re Alexander v. Lewis (Wash.), 175 Pac. 577., 
we quote this case because of the simplicity in which 
contracts relating to testamentary disposition of proper-
ty are treated. Here we say there is no mystery involved 
in the case at bar, the only question is, can we prove it 
or have 've proved~ 
"There is nothing mysterious or mystifying 
abou,t contracts to devise by will. They are valid 
and will be enforced as other contracts and 
' 
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'vhere the promisor has repudiated his c.ontract, 
and, although such a c.ontract is not broken until 
death so as to support a cause of action, one court 
at least has gone so far as to hold that a. bill quia 
tin1et is available to fix the legal status of prop-
erty 'vhere the pronrisor has repudiated his con-
tract during his lifetin1e and has atte1npted to 
make other disposition of his property.* • :it: 
· "\Vhile the testator 1nay destroy the will or exe-
eute another revoking it, the contract itself can-
not be rescinded, and "'ill be enforced by the court 
in favor of the person who has acted upon it.' 
Underhill on the La'v of "\Vilis, Sec. 289." (Italics 
ours). 
In 106 A.L.R., page 7 58 "~e find the rule stated, upon 
this subject, as follows : 
'"As pointed out in earlier annotations, it 
seems that in order that part performance may 
· operate to take a contract of the kind under con-
sideration herein out of the operation of the Stat-
ute of Frauds, the services must be exceptional 
and extraordinary in character, or it must appear 
that the promisee's whole course of life would 
change by performance of the contract." 
Likewise ·73 A.L.R., page 1392 again announces the 
rule: 
"* * * The undertaking of each to perform 
was a sufficient consideration for the promise of 
the other. That it was oral does not affect its 
enforcement. Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 490, 41 
N.W. 514. The breach of it by the one cannot 
but operate as a fraud upon the other. The hus-
band continued to rely upon the contract, and at 
his death all of his property passes to his wife 
under his will. While by mutual consent the con-
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tract might have. been abrogated during the life-
time of the husband, at his death it became an 
irrevocable oibliga tion on the. part of the wife.'' 
In Goodin v. Castlemen (N.D.), 200 N.W. 95, we find 
this language : 
"Where a will is made pursuant to a contract 
for support, in which the party to furnish the 
support is 111ade the beneficiary, and where such 
party had entered upon the performance in the 
1nanner contemplated, and has not repudiated 
or broken his obligation, the will may not be 
revoked so as to deprive him of his contract 
rights." 
Under the instant case we have a contract and full 
perforn1ance throughout lifetime, and likewise. full per-
formance by the promisor in that he made the will pur-
suant to contract, and we insist that any atten1pt to 
revocate that will, as to the contractual features, i~ 
against all law, equity and justice. 
Let us also call the court's attention to the fact that 
counsel has failed to quote the California statute which 
gives us relief under the same Statute of Frauds. 
Civil Code (Calif.), 1931: 
''1623-Contract not in writing, through 
fraud, may be enforced against fraudulent party. 
When a contract, which is required by law to be 
in writing, is prevented from being put into writ-
ing by the fraud of a party thereto, any other 
party who is by such fraud led to believe that 
it is in writing, and acts upon belief to his pre-
judice, 1nay enforce it against the fraudulent 
party." 
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''1972-Last section not to extend to certain 
cases. The preceding section must not be con-
strued to affect the power of a testator in the 
disposition of his real property by a last will and 
testament, nor to prevent any trust from arising 
or being extinguished by implication or operation 
of law, nor to abridge the powers of any court 
to compel specific performance of an agreement, 
in case of part performa.nce thereof". (Italics 
ours). 
On the question of fraud, let us say in passing, 
there is no direct evidence of fraud in the oral p-romise 
to make the will, but having made the will he revokes 
it, which gives vitality to the theory that the entire oral 
promise was intended to deceive Lillian Jackson and 
defraud the beneficiaries of the will. 
Likewise the delivery of the W.O.W. certificate, while 
it may have been delivered in good faith and upon the 
representation that it was a paid up certificate, may not 
have been, at the time, intended as a fraud, but the later 
diversion of said certificate to his later wife would relate 
back to the initial transaction, clearly showing a fraud 
and a deception practiced upon his first wife. 
Let us call the court's attention to the fact that 
immediately after entering into the marriage settlement 
and the delivery of the W.O.W. certificate to Lillian 
Jackson, he wrote the W.O.W. that he had lost the cer-
tificate and had another one issued to the four girls. 
This may have been entirely genuine and done pursuant 
to the oral agreement, but later, after he married Miss 
Cordova, this certificate was cancelled and a new one 
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issued to the new wife. This of itself constitutes a fraud 
which likewise relates back to .the oral agree.ment. 
Fuller v. Nelle et al., 55 Pac. 2d 1248 (Calif.). This 
case is decidedly involved orver a probate court jurisdic-
tion. However, it is sta.ted: 
"Testatrix who orally agreed with husband 
not to revoke a n1utual will and who, upon the 
husband's death, received and accepted the hus-
band's estate, could not transfer as'sets of the two 
spouses in violation of the terms of agreement 
(oral) with her husband." (Italics ours). 
Also at Page 1250 it is said: 
"In view of what has been said above we think 
it is clear that it becomes whoJly immaterial that 
the probate court found that the purported writ-
ten revocation was valid, th~ purported holo-
graphic will was valid, and that the defendant 
Mrs. Nelle was not guilty of duress, fraud, men-
ace, or undue influence. No one of those facts 
eliminates, or tends to eliminate, the contention 
that, after Mrs. Fuller had received and accepted 
the estate .of her deceased husband, she. was in no 
position to then transfer the assets of the two 
spouses in violation of the terms of her agreement 
'vith her husband." 
Also observe the discussion of the case of Aho v. 
K usnert, 87 P. 2d 358 (Cal.) To quote: 
"The second count alleged that plaintiffs' 
stepfather induced their mother to purchase prop-
erty with her separate funds in reliance on his 
representation and promise that plaintiffs should 
have the property when the mother and 'ste'Pfather 
'were gone.' In violation of the promise· he de-
vised the property to the defendant, whom'he! mar-
I '' i i 
II 
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ried after the dea.th of the plaintiffs' n1other. De-
spite the fact that the agreement was oral, the 
c.ourt held that the defendant received the prop-
erty in trust for the plaintiffs. As stated in the 
opinion: 'By reason of his pron1ise and under-
standing " .. ith plaintiffs' mother Kusne·rt (the 
father), upon her death, rec.eived title to real prop-
erty paid for in part by her se·parate funds and in 
part by eomn1unity funds. He broke his promise 
to her " .. hen he devised said property to his second 
wife. In such circmnsta.nces equity, through fas-
tening a trust upon the property, will secure to 
plaintiffs the benefits of said promise although 
orally made." 12 Cal. 2nd at Page 690. 
Ryan v. Welte (Cal) 198 P. 2d 3'57. This case up-
holds and enforces an oral agreement to make a will and 
stresses the point that the Statute of Frauds cannot be 
imposed to defeat an oral agreen1ent to make a will in his 
behalf. 
It is also an interesting case upon n1any of the fun-
damentals of cases of this type. To quote: 
'~ ( 4-6) Citing the facts in the cases of Brazil 
v. Silva, supra; and Fuller v. Nelle, 12 Cal. App. 
2d 576, 55 P. 2d 1248, defendants contend that 
there are no similar allegations of actual fraud 
in the complaint here·. While the word 'fraud' is 
not used and while the facts here are different 
than those shown in the cited cases, the complaint 
does allege the fact that Daniel in complete disre-
gard of his agreement conveyed and devised the 
property to others than those entitled to it under 
the agreement. This, as will be pointed out later, 
constituted constructive fraud. As said in N otten 
v. ~fen sing, 3 Cal. 2d 469, 45 P. 2d 198, 202 : 'In 
order to raise the estoppel, fraud in some form 
is essential, but it is not required that an actual 
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intent to defraud or mislead exist; all that is re-
quired is that there exist "a fraud inhering in the 
consequence of thus setting up the statute.' * * * 
Although in the present case fraud is not. alleged 
as a conclusion, the facts from which that conclu-
sion nece'ssarily follows are alleged." 
In the case of Freenten et al v. River Fa.rms Com-
pany (Cal.) 1936, 44 Pac. 2d 199, the plaintiff here sued 
on an oral protnise that the president of the defendant 
company promised to take up bonds of the corporation 
and cash them and pay for repair \Vork on its ditches. 
The defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds (Civil 
Code, Sec. 1624, subdivision 4). The court held, however, 
that the 'vork was fully perforn1ed and that it was neces-
sary work for the corporation and held that the Statute 
of F'rauds had no application. 
In the case of Grant v. Long et al (Cal.), 92 P. 2d 
940. Quoting froin the sylabus 'vhich is strictly followed 
by the opinion of the court. 
"Frauds, Statute of-The fundamental rule, 
that as the statute of frauds is designed to pre-
vent faud it cannot be invoked to: perpetrate a 
fraud, is based on the doctrine of estoppel and is 
applied in cases in which one party in reliance 
on a pa.rol contract that should ·have been reduced 
to writing has changed his position or parted with 
value so that it would be an injustice to permit 
the other party to plead the statute of frauds." 
The court said the contract had been fully performed 
for many years and the defendant was estopped to set 
up the Statute of Frauds. 
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Mayborne -v. Citize-ns' Trust & Sa.l:ings Ba.n.k, (Cal.) 
1920, 188 Pac .. 1034. While this case deals with quantum 
meruit it has some interesting features of the ease at 
bar. 
Quoting from sylabus : 
'~'vork and Labor - That Payment Would 
be Equitable Considered in Determining Intent to 
Pay. In an action against the estate of a decease.d 
person to obtain value of service~s rendered, it 
was proper for the trial court, in determination 
of intention of parties, to weigh the circumstance 
that it would be just and equitable for plaintiff to 
be rewarded for her services. 
~•Limitation of Actions-Statute does not Run 
Against ..... -\ction for Services Under Contract for 
Indefinite Time. Where a contract to pay for ser-
vices, express or implied, is for an indefinite time, 
and no time for payment is specified, the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until the serv-
ices end." 
Burrows v. Burrows et ttx, (Cal.), 22 Pac. 2d 1072, 
1934. This is another case in point but emphasizes one 
particular feature of our case and that is in dealing with 
family relations the master mind of the family cannot 
hold benefits conferred by others in such relationship 
unless such others had independent advice. 
This case likewise was take·n out of the Statute 
of Frauds by reason of oral promises. 
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Jones v. Clark, (Cal.) 119 P. 2d 731, 1941. This case 
was mentioned by court or counsel in the oral argument 
but refers specifically to specific performance which was 
disallowed by the court. 
It lays down the doctrine that mutuality of remedy 
applies only to executory contracts and not executed 
contracts, as in the case at bar. 
In re Brown v. Superior Court, (Cal.), 212 P. 2d 881, 
1949. This case is not only in point gene-rally but goes 
specifically to the point of right of party to revoke a will: 
"It is argued by respondent that petitioner 
has not shown an actual or potential cause of ac-
tion because he has not alleged that the contract 
between George and Abigail contained an express 
agreen1ent not to revoke the mutual wills. It is not 
necessary, however, that there be an express 
agree1nent to this effect in order to enforce a con-
tractual obligation to leave property to designated 
persons at death. In every contract there is an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
that neither party 'vill do anything which injures 
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the 
agreernen t. (Citing 128 P. 2d 665 (Cal.), 177 P. 2d 
931 (Cal.) "\Vhere the parties contract to· make a 
particular. disposition of property by will, the 
agreement necessarily includes a promise not to 
breach the contract by revoking the will and fail-
ing to dispose of the property as agreed. The 
rights of the parties depend upon the contract, 
and the revocation of the will or other bre,ach of 
the contract does not prevent the intended de-
vises or legatee fron1 enforcing the contractual 
obligations." (Citing many authorities). 
In re Sargavak's Estate, 216 P. 2d 850. (Apr. 1950): 
"Declarations made by a testator at, before 
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or after execution of an instrun1ent are admissible, 
if offered for the purpose of ascertaining the in-
tent with which instrument was executed and not 
for purpose of proving the meaning testator attri-
buted to specific provisions of an admitted will." 
Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P. 2d 737, (Cal.), 19150. 
This case assembles and correlates nearly every case 
that has come before the Courts of California. This. ac-
tion was for services rendered and held to be of peculiar 
and unusual character. 
After oral agreement that he would be given one-
half interest in the Estate property, we find that one 
Christie, on promise of the inheritance, worked diligently 
in the family venture. He gave up any opportunity for 
further education or any chance of accumulating proper-
ty of his own. He received only his room and board and 
spending money. When he was married and suggested 
the possibility of other emploryment to support his wife, 
he was told to move into the family, that he, Christie, 
need not worry for he would receive the property when 
Natale and Carmela died. The p·rop·erty increased in 
value to $100,000. 
The court held that the oral p·romise to make a will 
was good and that he was entitled to the prop·erty. The 
opinion holds: 
"The controlling question is whether plaintiff 
is estopped from relying upon the statute: of 
frauds (Civil Code No. 1624; Code Civ. Proc. No. 
1973) to defeat the enforcement of the oral coo-
tract. The doctrine of estoppel to assert the stat-
ute of frauds has been consistently applied by the 
courts of this state to prevent fraud that would 
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result fron1 refusal to enforce oral contracts in 
certain circumstances. Such fra.ud may inhere in 
the unconscionable injury that would result from 
denying enforcement of the contract after one 
party has been induced by the other seriously to 
change his position in reliance on the contract, 
* * *'' (Quoting many cases.) (Underscoring 
ours). 
The above case is worthy of serious consideration, 
it goes into the questions of fraud, specific performance, 
quantum merruit, and oral contracts and clearly shows 
the change and progress in theory in the recent c·aii-
fornia cases and the earlier ones on these questions. 
Walker v. Calloway, 222 P. 2d 455, (Cal.) 1950. This 
case closely follows Monarco v. Lo Grece. It is an action 
for . specific performance of an oral agreen1ent to will 
decedent's entire estate to the plaintiff in consideration 
for services rendered decedent. After making the prom-
is to will, the property was willed to another. The plain-
tiff was formerly the wife of decedent and they lived 
separate and apart. She was induced to return from 
Michigan to California to nurse and care for the deceased 
by reas<~ln of the oral promise to will his property to her. 
In its opinion the court says : 
"Where a contract is within the statute of 
frauds, as it is here, Civ. Code, sec. 1624 ( 6) ; Code 
Civ. Proc. sec. 1973 ( 6), the mere rendition of 
services is not usually such a part performance of 
a verbal agreement as will relieve the contract 
from the operation of the statute, but 'if the se-rv-
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ices are of such a peculiar e.haract.er that it is im-
possible to estimate their value by any pecuniary 
standard, and it is evident that the parties did not 
intend to measure them by any such standard, 
cases the reason for the interposition of equity 
is quite obvious. Plaintiff has rendere.d service 
of extraordinary and exceptional character-such 
service as, in contemplation of the parties, was not 
to be compensated for in money, and, as in con-
templation of law, cannot be compensated for in 
money. Therefore by no action at law could a 
plaintiff be restored to his original position. It 
would be in the nature of a fraud upon him to deny 
him any relief, and, the law failing by reason of 
its universality, equity, to promote justice, makes 
good its imperfections. W at. Sp·ec. Perf. Cont 
sec. 41; Porn. Spec. Perf. sec. 114. Owens v. Mc-
Nally, 113 Cal. 444, 450, 45 P. 710, 712, 33 L.R .. A. 
369; McCabe v. Healy, 138 Cal. 81, 70 P. 1008; 
Anno. 69 A.L.R. 14, 120, et seq; 106 A.L.R. 742, 
756, et. seq.". 
Likewise this case lays down all the necessary re-
quirements for proof in such action and thoroughly ana-
lyzes dozens of c·alifornia cases on the subject, finally 
holding that the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial under 
the peculiar circumstances of the case. 
It will be observed, also, that the services of the 
plaintiff were of short duration, from May 1947 to Janu-
ary 6, 1948. 
Berkey v. Hahn, 224 P. 2d 885. (Dec. 1950). At page 
889: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
62 
"Where a party to an oral contract has been 
induced by the other party seriously to ·change 
his position in reliance upon, or in performance of 
the contract, and would suffer an unconscionable 
injury if it were not enforced, or if unjust enrich-
ment would result * * * the doctrine of estoppel 
will be invoked and the statute of frauds will not 
be available to perpetuate the fraud. * * *" 
This case refers to Monarco v. Lo-Greco as the latest 
expression of the Supreme Court on the subject. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and authorities we 
most earnestly contend that: 
1-The Trial Court should have admitted the testi-
mony of the Plaintiff in relation to the oral agreement 
with the deceased, John Jackson, respecting the willing 
of parts of his estate to the children of both plaintiff and 
John Jackson. 
2-The Trial Court should have received all the 
testimony of attorney, Knox Patterson. 
3-The Trial Court should not have rejected the un-
disputed testimony of the witness Joe Dennis and other 
undisputed testimony. 
4-The Trial Co!lrt should have considered sepa-
rate writings which related to each other and bore out 
the oral testimony offered in the case. 
5-The Court Inisconstrued the Statute of Frauds 
and Conflict of laws in relation to the case at bar. 
6-The Trial Court should have considered plain-
tiff's plea of Estoppel to defendant's plea of the Statute 
of Frauds. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
63 
Finally we contend that judgtnent should be ordered 
by this court as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint, upon 
the facts and the law of the case, or at the very minimum, 
that the case be remanded for a new trial with instruc-
tions to admit all the above mentioned testimony offered 
by the plaintiffs and to enter judgment accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KNOX PATTERSON, 
0. A. TANGREN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Address : 205 Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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